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Egypt: Europe’s other north African border 
 




This year, there has not been any migrant boat arriving from Egypt so far. Is this an effect of 
the new Egyptian anti-smuggling law? In the meantime, migrants in the north African 
country experience arbitrary detentions for indefinite periods, deportations which violate 
international law and scarce or non-existent protection for those who supposedly have a 
right to it. Asylum is a taboo for the authorities in Cairo, and the UN agency for refugees 
does what it can (but also - according to accusations by several workers - a lot less than 
that), while the work of humanitarian organisations in this sector is limited by the Egyptian 
regime’s repressive actions. In the meantime, the IOM, Italy and other EU countries renew 
their programmes to support Egyptian border guards, and the EU has agreed a five-fold 
increase in its budget for Egypt from the Africa Trust Fund. 
 
Author’s note: In this article, the names of the people I spoke with, as well as those of many of 
the organisations they represent, have been left out. This is for reasons of security and privacy, 
and it was almost always done after an explicit request to do so by the interested parties. 
 
A quiet season 
 
“I think there will be no more boats leaving Egypt. It doesn’t depend on increased sea border 
patrols: they never patrolled the North Coast systematically, they are not going to do it now either. 
It’s the Ministry of Interior that controls smuggling: they are directly involved! Now they have 
decided to stop it, so there will be no more departures”.  
 
The person speaking is a representative of one of  the many non-governmental organisations t hat 
is working to provide assistance to migrants in Egypt. In the two months (February and March) that 
I spent in the north Afr ican country, between Cairo and Alexandria, I met around thirty peo ple, 
representatives of international organisations and NGOs, European diplomats, representatives of  
the Egyptian governme nt and othe r experts. Many of them were c onvinced that the Egyp tian 
authorities are involved in the smuggling activities. “ Sometimes they arrest many people, other 
times they don’t arrest anybody. They make agreements with money”, a worker from another NGO 
told me. Ho wever, not everyone is convinced that the departures are destined to cease: it will 
depend on the government’s actual political will, and it is yet to be ascertained whether it exists. 
 
What is certain, is that there have not been any more departures after the ill-fated shipwreck off the 
port city of Rosetta on the past 21 September 2016, which resulted in hundreds of victims a nd 
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placed Egypt in the  media spotlight and that of European political actors (Martin Schulz ca lled for 
an EU-Egypt agreement inspired by the one with Turkey). Si nce then, no other boats have arrived  
in Italy from Egypt, and there have only been around ten arre sts on the northern coast of the north 
African country: all of t hem were Syrians, stopped not at s ea but on land, in Marsa Matrouh, on a 
single occasion (moreover, they are believ ed to have been heading f or Libya to  embark an d 
attempt the crossing from there).  
 
In 2016, the deteriorating living conditions in Libya pushed a growing n umber of people to attempt 
the longer crossing fro m Egypt, as long as the y could avoid the violence and abu ses they would 
have been subjected to in the ne ighbouring country. Apart from the hundreds of deaths and 
disappearances caused by shipwrecks (from the deadly disaster on  9 April to the one on 21 
September), 12,000 of t he people who embarked in Egypt last year had managed to reach Italy,  
whereas a similar number had bee n stopped by the Egyptian authorities just before or just after  
their departure. Of the latter group, the majority were Egyptians, while  around 5,000 were foreign 
citizens, 1,500 of whom were arrested just in June. While all these figur es represented records in 
comparison with previous years, in this year the counting for each of the categories has not shifted 
from zero. The interruption of de partures may have simply been due to a w inter break (the 
crossing from Egypt is much longer than that from Libya, and it is impossible to try one’s luck in the 
winter). However, last year the first boat arrived when it was just February. Now, it is mid-April and 
we are still waiting. 
 
Detentions, deportations and the new law against smuggling  
 
This year the wait for the “season” to begin is felt more stro ngly as a result of the new law agai nst 
migrant smuggling that  was approved last November. It was praised by Naela Gabr, the fo rmer 
Egyptian ambassador to the UN, r ecently appointed director of the interministerial “committee on 
combating and preventing illegal migration and human trafficking” that was created in January of 
this year to unite the two previou sly existing committees: the one against illegal migration  
(established in 2014) a nd that against human trafficking (f ounded four years earlier). Gabr, wh o 
was formerly the director of the old committee against illegal migration, explained to me that: 
 
“before the new law, smugglers could not be sanctioned at all, unless they were involved in other 
crimes (e.g. document falsification, murder etc.). Now, everything has changed”. 
 
The law envisages some very high economic sanctions an d a range of prison sentences up to life 
imprisonment for the people responsible for smuggling activities, but it aims t o involve the  
population at large by introducing a duty to inform for anyone who becomes aware of smuggling-
related activities: people who fail to report them risk spending at least six months in  prison and a  
substantial fine. A fundamental role in pushing and shepherding the Egyptian authorities along the 
path towards the law’s adoption was played by both th e IOM (International Or ganization for 
Migrations) and UNODC (the UN office  on drugs and crime). These two UN agencie s first 
convinced the government of the desirability of adopt ing a law in this field, and they then offered  
assistance to draft its text. 
 
Now, all th at’s left is f or the enactment regulations to be approved. Then, if there will be any 
departures and hence arrests of smugglers or suspected smugglers, it will be possible to observe 
how the law will be applied in practice. Europe is already getting busy: in March the French agency 
Expertise France went to Egypt to study the Egyptian judici al system and evaluate its capab ility to 
enact the n ew provisions. The United Kingdom has financed an IOM-managed p roject with t wo 
million euros whose o bjectives include that of supporting implementation of  the law agai nst 
smuggling. 
 
Gabr is very keen to stress that the law does not criminalise migrants, but ju st smugglers. The 
former are portrayed as victims of the latter and, as a result, they are not liable to incur in 
sentences or fines. Even in Egypt, increasingly often, in order to safeguard migration policies from 
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criticism about their re strictive, inequitable and violent character, what is str essed is th eir 
adherence to human rights stand ards and the goal of protecting migrants – not just fro m 
smugglers. “We respect international human rights standards”, Gabr continued. “For example, we 
don’t return people if they don’t want to be returned”.  
 
The reality is very different, as all t he people from non-go vernmental organisations I talked t o 
observed, and it consists of countless and systemat ic detentions of migrants for indefinite periods  
which are only resolved once a detainee accep ts to pay to buy themselves an aeroplane ticket or 
when they are removed by force. Some repatriations are en acted in cooperation with IOM (which, 
however, does not coo perate in re patriations towards countries that are not dee med safe, like  
Syria, Eritrea, Yemen, South Sudan and a large part of Somalia). The IOM’s assisted voluntary 
return (AVR) projects a re supported with conviction by Eu ropean countries, which are it s main 
funders. The IOM representatives I spoke with assured me that: 
 
“we always check that the migrants have been effectively informed about the current situation in 
their countries of origin, and that they really have a will to return there”.  
However, they too are conscious that the difference between a volunta ry and a forced repatriation 
is ephemeral, when the alternative is to stay and waste away for an indefinite period in an Egyptian 
jail.  
 
However, the accounts I have collected talk of frequent repatriations a nd returns which go well 
beyond the so-called  “voluntary” repatriations enacted with support from IOM (and from the 
European countries that finance the corresponding project s). Detention centres, in Egypt  like in 
Europe, are the pillar carrying the burden of t his system. They are divided into  three differ ent 
typologies. The first includes small-size d facilities in the  police stat ions of several inhabit ed 
centres. Most people (including th e many pe ople who are arrested on the mainland bef ore 
embarking) are detaine d in these places at fir st. The second categor y includes military camps, 
where the people (a minority) who are caught at sea by the Eg yptian navy end up. Ordinary 
prisons represent the third and final category. It is where the people who do not swiftly accept th e 
option of repatriation are transferred. There are not any formal agreements between the Egypti an 
authorities and the various organisations that offer their services to detainees (IOM, UNHCR – the 
United Nations agency for refugees, which also acts through its contractual partners, among which 
are Caritas and several local and international NGOs – and very few i ndependent organisations). 
By and larg e, in police stations and military ca mps access is allowed to people providing food, 
basic necessities and medical and psychological assista nce, but this happens on the basis of 
relationships of trust w hich the org anisations build up over time with the individua ls who are in  
charge of running the centres. In fact, it is th ese actors who decide everything:  “In detention 
centres, the law is made by the directors”, I was told by a humanitarian organisation. And various 
agencies, including UNHCR itself, have often been den ied access in more than one centr e. 
“Sometimes we succeed in having people registered with UNHCR while they are in detention, but 
in many cases we don’t even know who is detained”, claimed a lawyer from an  association that 
provides legal assistance. After all, even when the identity of those who are detained is known, it is 
often impossible to do anything to get them released: this was the case of an Eritrean woman, who 
had never registered with UNHCR and was detained for nineteen months in the north of Egypt with 
her two children, five and six years old, and who was only allowed to leave the detention cen tre 
when she accepted to take an aeroplane to Ethiopia less than two months ago; this is also true for 
several unaccompanied minors. While this is the situation in po lice stations and military camps, 
that in ord inary prisons – the third  category of detention centres for f oreigners – is even more 
alarming. Nobody gets in there. Ev en when a few detainees give in  and accept IOM-assisted 
returns, the preliminary meetings with the or ganisation’s representatives take place in neut ral 
facilities outside of the prison. “Hundreds of potential refugees are held in prisons and deported”, is 
how the local represent ative of an international religious or ganisation summed the situation u p. 
Moreover, in the backdrop to this g eneral picture there are some local peculiarities. For example, 
the entire Upper Egypt region, towards the border with Sudan, “is a black hole: the arrests carried 
out there are not even included in the official statistics”, an NGO worker claimed. What is certain, is 
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that none of the centres there are a ccessible: “that is a veritable no-go area”, a UNHCR worker 
confirmed. 
 
Regardless of where people are detained, in an y case, ma ny repatriations take place in blata nt 
breach of the non-refoulement principle, as happened to three Syrians sent back to Damascus last  
January or to Ethiopian citizen s of the Oromo et hnic group, who are systematically persecuted i n 
their country. Moreover, various people from different nationalit ies are pushed back into 
neighbouring Sudan, a transit country on the route to Egypt, not just for a large part of African  
migrants but also for Syrians, since t he moment when Egypt and the other countries in the regio n 
alike, - except for Sudan – imposed a visa req uirement on them. “ When Syrians are deported to 
Sudan, the government doesn’t give any formal reasons for this”, I was told at the UNHCR offices. 
 
Asylum in Egypt: the role played by UNHCR 
 
After all, asylum is not an issue which the Egyptian authorities enjoy discussing. The tone of the 
director of the inter-ministerial committee on combating and preventing illegal migration and human 
trafficking was relaxed while I left her to praise the progr ess made by Egypt in activities to fight 
irregular migrations (which are – she explained – “simply an organised crime problem”). Yet, in no 
time at all, her glance b ecame more sombre and her voice hardened as soon as I asked her why 
Egypt does not just n ot have an  asylum la w yet, but it is not even working with a vie w to 
introducing one. “We don’t need an asylum law!”, she answered in a temper, “ we already ratified 
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol!”. However, Egypt has int roduced some reservations 
to the Convention which do not gu arantee access to e ssential public services such as education 
and the health system and which allow discrimination in the emplo yment market. Without an 
asylum law (and hence of services and facilit ies made available by the state), responsibi lity for 
anything that concerns asylum seekers is borne by UNHCR. 
 
Nonetheless, the agency for refugees has to deal with numerous and very serious limits which a re 
partly caused by the scant available resources and in part by the Egyptian state authorities. In the 
first place, people wishing to apply f or asylum do not immediately receive a reside nce permit: the 
first document that they are issued simply certifies that they have requested an app ointment with 
UNHCR, but it is not  recognised in any way by the Egyptian authorities. From th at moment on , 
between one and four months pass (two months on average) before they are received by the UN 
agency (and hence officially registered as asylum seekers), and during this time of uncertainty they 
are left ent irely at the mercy of the governme ntal authorities’ arbitrary actions. “ By doing so”, a 
worker from an international NGO complained: 
  
“UNHCR is creating a protection gap. They do this because they were pressured by the Egyptian 
government”. 
 
UNHCR sources admit ted that “ The authorities are afraid that we could become a pull factor, 
attracting more people”, but they mainly blame d the gaps in protection  on the scarce resource s 
which are available. Although its st affing levels hav e constantly grown  over the last few years,  
UNHCR struggles to manage a population of refugees and asylum seekers which the Syrian crisis 
has increased in the past years, and which an increase in arrivals from the Horn of Africa and other 
sub-Saharan countries maintain high even after the evident decrease in arrivals from Syria. If we 
add 34,000 Sudanese nationals, 12,000 Ethiopians, 8,000 Iraqis, 7, 000 Eritreans and 18, 000 
citizens from 61 other countries t o the 118,000 Syrians who are present, we reach a total of 
197,000 people who were under UNHCR protection in Egypt during the past month of January (the 
figures do not include Palestinian s, which UNHCR is not allowed to deal with). As a result, even  
the waiting times for the interviews that will determine the decision on asylum applications amount, 
overall, to around two years fro m the mo ment when they registered as asylum seekers, and  
UNHCR does not envisage that t hey may be shortened before 2019. In case s where refugee 
status is granted a blue-coloured document is issued: the blue card, which is valid f or three years 
and may be renewed. 
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A further, serious, limitation of asylum applicants’ rights consists in the fact that people who do not 
possess a passport or another identity document  when they register with UNHCR receive  
discriminatory treatment. While pe ople who can prove their identity receive a yellow-colour ed 
temporary document (the yellow card, which is valid for a year and ma y be renewed), the others  
receive a w hite one (the white card, valid for  six months and renewable as well)  that does not 
protect them from arrest and deportation. While it is true  that Egyptian authorities, when they wish  
to do so,  do not have any scruples about arresting and deporting people who possess a yellow 
card as well, the insecurity of the conditions experienced by white card holders is far greater. 
 
The person from UNHCR who I spoke with abo ut this was unable to cite any other country in t he 
world where the people who do not possess documents are subjected to this kind of discrimination 
by the bod y which is tasked with  protecting them, and admitted it was an unusual way of  
proceeding: 
 
“We don’t normally expect people to have documents, generally, but here in Egypt we have people 
who come for reasons other than asylum, and sometimes they have documents but conceal them, 
so we try to regularize asylum in Egypt”.  
 
This means that UNHCR makes the arguments normally used by state authorities (that of security,  
that of false  asylum seekers) its o wn and ends up reducing the number of bene ficiaries and, at 
least in part, it abdicates from its m andate. Another measure adopted f or the purpose of “making 
asylum more regular”, is that of scanning the irises of all those who register with UNHCR. “So we 
are sure we are advocating for the right people, and we can check that they don’t sell their yellow 
or blue cards!”, they told me at UNHCR. A very unique circumstance is represented by the fact that 
when UNHCR has permission to g o to register  asylum seekers in th e detention centres, the UN 
agency also scans the irises of the other foreign detainees: this activity makes UNHCR resemble 
an agency for the control of people’s mobility, prior to its role for the protection of refugees. 
 
Contradictions and hierarchies 
 
The problem is that UNHCR, in Egypt like and even more than elsewhere, is trapped by the  
intersecting contradictions between its mandate (the protect ion of refugees), the objectives of the 
European destination countries which are among UNHCR’s main contributors (to block migrants 
and refugees in north African cou ntries and stop them at tempting the Mediterranean crossing; 
establishing reliable national asylum systems in those countries so that third country nationals who 
have travelled through  them may be returne d there in  the future), and the objectives of t he 
Egyptian state authorities (reducing the number of migrants and refugees in Egyptian territory to a 
minimum, deporting the largest possible number of them without setting up a reliable nation al 
asylum system, both in order to avoid attracting refugees from countries in crisis and to avoid  
being sent back those who do manage to rea ch Europe). The outcome of these  tensions is an 
attitude which appears to be excessively prudent, in the view of several  other operators. “Just like 
IOM, UNHCR is a sub-governmental agency, their mentality is that of diplomats”, the 
representative of an Eg yptian NGO noted. Me mbers of another NGO claimed that: “The people 
from UNHCR avoid complaining about the violations they witness, they prefer to close their eyes 
even when the people subjected to them are the weakest, as in the case of unaccompanied minors 
who are detained. They are too afraid of the Egyptian authorities”. When, in February of this year, 
a Somali man who was a white card holder died from a disease in a detention centre, the comment 
from a representative of another association w as: “UNHCR knew about it but didn’t do anything”. 
From UNHCR, they assured that they always do their best to free and assist people, not just those 
who have a white card, but also the others, who are ofte n potential asylum see kers as well. 
Nonetheless, they admit that whereas yellow card holders are usually released, sooner or later, for 
the others “it’s difficult, and we are very cautious”. 
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Another criticism which is levelled against  UNHCR from various quarters concerns the  
considerable shortening of the times for individual interviews to determine the st atus of asylum 
seekers. “UNHCR interviews used to last three to four hours, sometimes even six hours (over two 
days) until 2015. Now their duration has been reduced to 1.5 hours”, a specialist lawyer told me. 
From an NGO, they specified that: 
 
“Not only is the duration of interviews less than half of what it used to be, but they make no 
preliminary preparation to the interview, they don’t explain anymore how the interview will work, 
which was meant to help the asylum seekers present their situation”. 
 
And they voice another charge against UNHCR: “ Up until 2015, the recognition rate for Oromo 
Ethiopians (who suffer persecution in Ethiopia) was over 60%, then it dropped to 10-20%, because 
UNHCR does not want to antagonise the Egyptian authorities”. Moreover, the waiting times for 
interviews in the case of Oromos are allegedly longer than average. The very friendly person who I 
met in UNHCR’s Cairo office managed to keep her composure when I asked her, in general, about 
the duration of interviews, which she claimed  “changes from case to case depending on the 
individual situation”, but her breathing suddenly became laboured as soon as I mentioned the word 
“Oromo”. When I went so far as to ask her for statistics on the recognition rate of their asylu m 
claims, the answer was blunt: “ no specific information is available”. The Oromo c ommunity has 
even organised demonstrations in front of UNHCR’s Cair o offices to protest against the w ay in 
which their asylum application s are managed. One demonstrator even set himself alight  last 
summer, dragging a friend who was trying to rescue him to death with him. Nothing appears to 
have changed since then. 
 
Some of the NGOs which spoke to me of UNHCR in a critical way are independent  organisations, 
while others are themselves part of the reception  system that is controlled by the UN agency. Th e 
number of organisations that participate to an extent  in the provision of services to  refugees has 
considerably increased over the last few years, follo wing the Syrian crisis. Most of th em offer their 
services, entirely or in part, on behalf of UNHCR, within the context of contracts agreed on an 
annual basis. “UNHCR is the most powerful player, because it’s distributing money”, I was told by 
the spokesman of an organisation which has never received any money from the refugee agency.  
 
UNHCR organises meetings every month, divided into th ematic working groups,  between the 
different agencies providing assistance. The participants are not just the international organisations 
involved (IOM, UNHCR and possibly other UN agencies like, for example, UNICEF) and UNHCR’s 
numerous contracted p artners, but also a ll the other NGOs operating in this sect or and which,  
despite not having any contractual relations with UNHCR, are its de facto informal partners. T he 
meetings are useful occasions to avoid overlaps and duplication of activities by different actors, to  
share views about the  methodologies to be employed, to e xchange information and impressions, 
to discuss problems and seek shared solutions for the most difficult cases.  Concerning ce rtain 
problems and specific situations, however, it is best to keep a low profile. UNHCR issues the 
invitations, and there are people and groups which have been struck off the list of invitations due to 
the excessive insistence with which they stressed the need to safeguard the rights of migrants. 
 
Therefore NGOs depend on UNHCR, especially its contractual partners, and they are careful not 
to antagonise it, because the UN agency for refugees may decide not  to renew their contracts. At 
the same time, the org anisations must take care to avo id appearing suspect t o the Egypt ian 
authorities, because the list of UNHCR partners  must be approved every year by the government, 
which subjects the various agencies involved to security checks by the intelligence services. Thus, 
a relationship is create d between UNHCR an d the NGOs which is similar to that which exists 
between UNHCR and the Egyptian authorities: this considerable dependence strongly limits 
freedom of action and of criticism. This sense of subordination towards UNHCR i s such, that on 




Viewpoint: Egypt: Europe’s other north African border | 7 
 
“We are not allowed to be interviewed because we are an implementing partner of UNHCR. You 
should talk directly to them”, before accepting to talk after being promised anonymity (“but, please, 
don’t even mention the name of the association!”). 
 
After all, NGOs which are not contracted by U NHCR have to submit to the Egypti an authorities’ 
censorship as well. Freedom of association in Egypt had never been smothered before, in the way 
it is at pre sent. A new law approved last  autumn imposed some furth er restrictions in addition to 
those which already existed, and there are ne w ones co ming. An extremel y large number of 
associations have been  compelled to close sin ce Al Sisi t ook power in 2013. The last one, in 
February, was Nadeem, which was running a centre for the rehabilitation of victims of violence and 
torture, and also worked  with migrants. The most frequent allegations ar e of undertaking differen t 
activities from those for which their authorisatio n was granted and having received funding fro m 
abroad. Foreign fundin g is only a dmitted if f unds have been supplied through the accredited 
foreign diplomatic seats in Egypt, but in this case it is necessary to ask the Egyptian authorities for 
an authorisation, and then to wait for as much as longer than a year for an answer which may end 
up being negative anyways. Registering new associations is difficult as well: the procedure, again, 
may last longer than a year, and if it s outcome is negative the authorities do not even give you t he 
reasons for the refusal. The double form of conditioning which many NGOs suffer – fear of acts of 
censorship by the Egyptian authorities and that of losing financing supplied by UNHCR – may also 
have a neg ative effect on the be neficiaries of t he services they provide. So me of UNHCR’s 
executive partners, for instance, “ talk to people in detention centres and tell them: why don’t you 
go back home? They use exactly this phrase…”, as an eyewitness of what happens in t he 
detention centres told me. 
 
EU, member state and IOM cooperation with Egypt (but don’t mention human rights!) 
 
Trying to keep the refugees in Egypt rather than letting them advance towards Europe is, instea d, 
the declared objective of several employment pr ojects which UNHCR subcontracts to its partners.  
Such initiatives attempt to provide professional training to refugees and facilitate their entry into the 
labour market (also thr ough microcredit progr ammes), but they clash  with the great difficu lties 
encountered by refugees to obtain a work permit, including its excessive cost and the obligation for 
the Egyptian employer to demonstrate that there is not  any Eg yptian citizen who could b e 
employed instead of the refugee. 
 
Other factors contribute  to making the insertion  of refugees into society  harder and to make the  
idea of staying in Egypt unattractive for them. One of these is the impossibility of ha ving access to 
the public health system, which makes them dependent on the assistan ce provided by 
humanitarian organisations. Another one is the difficulty of attending schools. The government, by 
way of decrees, allows enrolment also for people who h ave registered with UNHCR, but  the 
growing number of aggressions and expressions of racism by schoolmates and teachers leads to a 
very high drop-out rate, especially among Syrians, who – moreover - are used to  a school system 
whose quality is superior. The efforts by some NGOs to offer alternative free training and 
educational paths do not manage to satisfy require ments entirely, which leaves many children  
excluded from any kind of education. 
 
Finally, the refugees are not offered any kind of acco mmodation. The Egypt ian government 
continues to reject the idea of camps, as the foreign secre tary was able to reiterate once again in 
March during a visit to Brussels, but the conditions for alternative solutions still do not exist. With 
the available funds, UNHCR manages to offer (minimal) economic contributions only to the most 
needy, grading them an d sorting them on the b asis of the conditions in which the  different family 
units live. 
 
Some of the activitie s to assist re fugees are financed by the development aid programmes 
managed by the foreign ministries of various European co untries. The interior ministries of those 
same countries, instead, have been busy for years in supporting the authorities in Cairo’s efforts to 
 
Viewpoint: Egypt: Europe’s other north African border | 8 
 
control the Egyptian borders. Leading the way in this f ield is Italy, which has a decades-old 
experience. Already in 2000, Italy and Egypt signed an agreement for police cooperation and, in 
2002, a liaison officer  for cooperation with the Egyptian authorities was deployed for the fir st time 
to the Italian embassy in  Cairo. At that time, ships that had set off from t he Indian Ocean carrying 
migrants (coming primarily from Sri Lanka) who were heading for Italy were transiting through the 
Suez Canal. Italy managed to impose checks in the Suez Canal that enabled the definitive closure 
of that route already in 2004, also thanks to charter flights offered by the Italian interior ministry to 
enact the f orced returns of intercepted people direct ly from Eg ypt. From that moment on,  the 
different Italian governments have  offered tra ining activities for the benefit of t he Egyptian 
authorities tasked with border controls on a re gular basis. In 2007 th e signing of a read mission 
agreement was achieved which, from that moment on, enabled continued return activities using a 
simplified procedure for Egyptian citizens stopped in the moment when they disembark irregular ly 
in Italy. In that same year, Italy dona ted the first patrol vessel (Squalo P50 model) to the Egyptian 
authorities. From then until 2010, other donations were to ensue: in struments to identify fa lse 
documentation and to o btain fingerprints (within the framework of a pr oject to develop AFIS, the 
Automatic Fingerprint Identification System, in Egypt), off-road vehicle s and other equipment, and 
finally another two 500 class patrol boats. “After the 2011 revolution”, according to sources at the 
Italian interior ministry: 
 
“we have been more cautious, as we did not know our counterparts well and did not know how 
things would have developed. This is why we stopped donating vehicles and equipment. But 
overall, police cooperation between Italy and Egypt in the field of immigration has always grown, 
regardless of external factors, even in these last years”.  
 
Even the [Giulio] Regeni incident did  not have a negative influence. The diplomatic crisis betwee n 
the Italian and Egyptian  governments caused by the murder of the young researcher led to th e 
recalling of the Italian ambassador, a year ago. The seat in Cairo remains vacant, but the absence 
of an ambassador is th e only tangible differen ce with the p ast. The Italian programme to provide  
assistance to the Egyptian authorit ies in t he field of bord er controls is more alive than ever. In  
2016, while ten representatives of the Egyptian committee against illegal migrat ion and hu man 
trafficking were travelling in Italy t o study the  best practices for the protection of vulnerable 
subjects, the training activities offered by the I talian interior ministry continued on  other fronts as  
well, just like joint investigative activities aiming to oppose the smugglers continued, starting from 
information exchanges concerning the owners of telephone lines involved in investigations. 
 
These investigations also concern activities that  are well beyond the mere facilitation of irregular 
migration. In Egypt, such activities can take on some particularly brutal characteristics. While some 
migrants are kidnapped and only released once a ransom is paid by their families, others are killed 
after having their organs removed, which are sold on the international black market. In April 20 16, 
there was a sensation about the case of nine  corpses of  Somali citizens that were found on a 
beach in Alexandria. Vital organs had been removed  from all their bodies, as can also b e 
understood from the enormous scars which can be seen in the bloodcurdling images which can be 
viewed online. 
 
Italy is not the only European country which has developed a line of co operation with the Egyptian 
police authorities insofar as the control of borders and migration movements are concerned. In July 
2016, Germany struck a police cooperation  agreement with the Al Sisi government wh ose 
ratification is underway in the parliament in Berl in. The agreement is in the fields of terrorism a nd 
organised crime, and migrant smuggling is entirely treated as part of the latter category, which was 
also the object of specif ic discussions during the German chancellor Angela Merkel’s visit to Cairo 
last March. Moreover, a liaison officer from the Bundeskriminalamt had already taken up an office 
in Cairo in April of last  year. Since then the German police has org anised numerous training 
courses in both Egypt and Germany for the Egyptian authorities in f ields which included, among 
others, border control, airport security and document recognition. Also the United Kingdom, Spain 
and France have commenced or are preparing to commence training activities for the benefit of the 
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Egyptian authorities in similar sectors. Finally, there are other countries which have only begun to 
interact with the Egyptian police authorities in the last few years following the crisis in 2015, and 
although their cooperation which is still informal does not go beyond that of information exchanges 
on smuggling, the intention is to further develop (and possibly formalise) these relationships in the 
field of irregular migrations. 
 
In turn, Egypt – a count ry which is at the cuttin g edge compared with others in the region – offers 
training courses in its own police academy fo r the authorities of neighbouring countries, als o 
thanks to the economic contribution by international organisations. A project which was developed  
by Italy within the framework of the Khartoum Process and which has not been realised  yet, 
envisaged the financing by the EU of training  activities for the authorities of the  countries in the 
Horn of Africa to be held at the Egyptian police academy. 
 
The goal of strengthening the Egyptian authorities’ competencies is also pursued by the IOM. First 
of all, IOM supports the Egyptian government in developing a national strategy and a plan of action 
against illegal migration and human traffickin g. Furthermore, the UN agency offers training 
activities for border guards deployed for checks at t he official entry points, for which the interior 
ministry is responsible (instead, the armed forces are tasked with tracking and cat ching migrants 
who attempt to cross the borders avoiding the official entry points). More generally, the IOM tries to 
push the Egyptian government towards adopting the concept of integrated border management as 
its own. Finally, the organisation has opened a dialogue with the Egyptian government to improve  
the search and rescue capabilities of its coast guard. “In the past, there was a discussion and there 
was an opening. We would like to do it”, they assured me at the IOM,  “and we are waiting for the 
situation to unblock”. In the meantime, the Egypt ian defence ministry – u nder whose authority the 
coast guard operates – has made contact with the Italian armed forces’ representatives to ask, as 
they told me at the Italian embassy, for: 
 
“an in-depth analysis on the organisation of our coast guard in the area of best practices: an 
exchange of updates on the respective modes of organisational, professional training and field 
training”.  
 
However, the issue of search and rescue con tinues to be  a taboo, especially insofar as what 
happens to the people who die at sea is concerned. In particular, while those who are identified as 
Egyptian are returned t o their families, it  is un clear how t he bodies o f foreigners who are n ot 
immediately identifiable are managed. The rep resentative of a small local organisation, when  I 
asked him about this point, involuntarily showed a degree of embarrassment and asked me if I did 
not have any other questions to  ask him. None of the oth er people I talked with – not even the  
main international organisations like UNHCR,  IOM and ICRC (the Int ernational Committee of  the 
Red Cross) – were able to tell me with any certainty who is respon sible for the identification and 
burial of people who have died at sea, and according to which criteria and modalities. From time to 
time, according to the partial (and sometimes contradictory) testimonies that I have  managed to 
collect, the government authorities have called upon  one or a nother of t he international 
organisations and a few local NGOs to cooperate, but there certainly is not any coordinating body, 
nor any official protocols that must be followed. 
 
Moreover, it is possib le that search and rescue activities may fall  within future European  
cooperation projects with the Egyptian authorities: what is being attempted by the EU with Serra j’s 
Libya (training for the  navy and the coast  guard also for the sake of search and rescue aimed at 
intercepting migrants before they leave the terri torial waters of the north African co untry) may be 
repeated with Al Sisi’s E gypt if Euro-Egyptian relations improve. What is certain is that there are 
two current objectives: the openin g of formal relations with Frontex (the European agency for 
border and coast guar d activities) and the d eployment to Cairo of an EU liaison officer. The 
prospects envisaged by the diplomatic repres entations of various European countries are 
divergent. One member state’s liaison officer stated that:  
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“I don’t think that an Egypt-Frontex agreement may be imminent, and the deployment of an EU 
liaison officer appears unlikely. Egypt is too skeptical regarding the European Union and prefers to 
maintain bilateral relations with individual countries, which guarantee a greater possibility of 
manoeuvre and negotiation”. 
 
One of his colleagues seconded to another embassy  views such a developmen t as possible: 
“Frontex’s visit here to Cairo last autumn was a novelty, it had never happened before. I do not rule 
out that it may lead to a cooperation between Frontex and the Egyptian authorities, although the 
relations between Egypt and the EU, which are not ideal, will need to be improved before that”. 
Instead, a third liaison officer from an EU country is certain that: 
 
“Frontex will establish formal relations with Egypt sooner or later, and the EU will be successful in 
sending a EU liaison officer, in the end, because the EU needs Egypt and Egypt needs the EU”. 
 
One of the  ways in w hich the EU is trying to convince Egypt that it “ needs Europe” is the 
investment of financia l resources for development projects, particu larly through the trust fu nd 
which was launched at the La Valletta summit in November 2015. The fund had earmarked 11.5 
million euros for Egypt and four countries (Italy, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands) h ad 
expressed an interest in undertaking projects in the north African country. Germany and Italy were 
meant to have engaged in professio nal training activities and the development of infrastructures in 
the areas which are more at risk of migration, whereas Spain and the Netherlands were meant to 
strengthen the Egyptian  authorities’ capabilities. The projects were meant to have started in  
January 2017 but then, according to the cooperation office of the embassy of an EU country “Egypt 
pulled the brake, both because the budget was deemed insufficient and because it has a scant 
interest in cooperating in any case”. Hence, in the past January, the EU sent a technical mission to 
Egypt to re view the terms of the agreement. In February,  at the time of a secon d mission, t he 
amount of European funding for Egypt was in creased more than five-fold, reachin g a total of 60 
million euros. However, the question concernin g the content of the projects remains open. The  
negotiating process is long and complex. An  operative meeting of the trust fund has been  
scheduled for May in Brussels. At that time, there should be a discussion on the new programmatic 
document for Egypt, including the budget increase, but – as I was told at another embassy: 
 
“the problem is about the activities: the specific activities still have to be negotiated. And if you 
mention ‘human rights’ to the Egyptian authorities they immediately close the door”. 
 
If the agreement will be reached, th ese activities will start in January 2018 and end in December 
2020. 
 
In the meantime, everything is quiet on the Mediterranean coast: is someone awaiting the outcome 
of the negotiations with the EU? 
 
[Translated by Statewatch]  
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